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  • Can the Supreme Court Regulate Election Freebies? The Constitutional Questions Behind a Long-Pending PIL

    The Supreme Court has once again been urged to hear a long-pending PIL challenging election freebies. Beyond the political debate, the case raises a deeper constitutional question: Can courts regulate electoral promises, or does that power lie with Parliament, the Election Commission and ultimately the voters? By Mahima Katal New Delhi, July 17: For more than four years, one of the most politically sensitive constitutional questions before the Supreme Court has remained unresolved: Can courts regulate electoral promises made by political parties? The issue resurfaced on Friday when advocate Ashwini Upadhyay urged the Supreme Court to urgently list a pending public interest litigation (PIL) seeking directions to deregister political parties or freeze their election symbols if they promise or distribute what the petition describes as "irrational freebies" before elections. While Chief Justice of India Surya Kant acknowledged the request, the Bench declined an immediate hearing, observing that the Court was currently "flooded with cases." The exchange may have lasted only a few minutes, but it revived a debate that goes to the heart of India's constitutional democracy. The central question is no longer whether election freebies are fiscally prudent or politically desirable. It is whether the judiciary has the constitutional authority to regulate political manifestos without entering territory reserved for Parliament, the Election Commission and ultimately, the electorate. A Case That Has Outlived Multiple Election Cycles The petition has been pending since 2022, when a Bench led by then Chief Justice N.V. Ramana issued notices to the Union government and the Election Commission of India (ECI). During those proceedings, the Court described the issue as "serious" and even suggested that a committee comprising stakeholders could examine the matter. Despite multiple mentions before the Court and several Assembly and general elections in the intervening period, no final hearing has taken place. The petition seeks far-reaching directions. It asks the Court to direct the Election Commission to deregister or withdraw the election symbol of any political party that promises "irrational freebies" from public funds. Alternatively, it seeks a direction to Parliament to enact a law regulating such promises. These prayers immediately raise a constitutional question: Can the Supreme Court compel either the Election Commission or Parliament to create new standards governing election manifestos? The Missing Legal Definition One of the most significant hurdles in the case is that Indian law contains no statutory definition of an "irrational freebie." Political parties routinely promise welfare schemes, subsidies, cash transfers, loan waivers, free electricity, education assistance, healthcare benefits and social security measures. Some of these programmes are implemented through legislation and budgetary allocations after governments assume office. Without a clear legal standard, distinguishing between a legitimate welfare policy and an unconstitutional electoral inducement becomes difficult. The Constitution itself does not prohibit governments from spending public money on welfare schemes. On the contrary, the Directive Principles of State Policy encourage the State to promote social and economic justice. The challenge, therefore, is determining whether an election promise is merely a policy proposal or an inducement that compromises the fairness of the electoral process. The Election Commission's Limited Powers The PIL also seeks directions requiring the Election Commission to amend the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 by introducing a condition that political parties must not promise irrational freebies. However, this raises another institutional question. The Election Commission undoubtedly enjoys wide powers under Article 324 of the Constitution to conduct free and fair elections. It also enforces the Model Code of Conduct during election periods. But its authority is not unlimited. The Commission cannot create substantive electoral offences without legislative backing. Nor can it impose conditions that effectively alter statutory rights or disqualify recognised political parties unless authorised by law. Whether Article 324 permits such regulatory expansion has repeatedly been debated before constitutional courts. Where Does Judicial Review End? The Supreme Court has often intervened to strengthen electoral integrity. Its judgments have recognised the right of voters to know candidates' criminal antecedents and assets, required greater transparency in elections and interpreted constitutional provisions to reinforce democratic accountability. Yet, the Court has also repeatedly cautioned against entering areas involving economic policy and legislative choices. Election manifestos are fundamentally political documents. They reflect competing visions of governance, taxation and public expenditure. Determining whether a particular promise is fiscally responsible often involves complex economic assessments rather than purely legal questions. If courts begin deciding which promises are constitutionally permissible, they may risk becoming arbiters of public policy instead of interpreters of law. That concern explains why successive Benches have approached the freebies debate cautiously despite acknowledging its significance. Welfare Versus Electoral Inducement The debate is often framed as one between "freebies" and fiscal discipline. Constitutionally, however, the issue is more nuanced. Governments routinely spend public resources on food security, education, pensions, healthcare and housing. These measures are often justified as fulfilling constitutional obligations under the Directive Principles. Political parties, meanwhile, campaign on promises to expand or redesign such programmes. The constitutional difficulty lies in identifying the point at which a welfare promise ceases to pursue a public purpose and instead becomes an impermissible inducement intended solely to influence voters. That assessment may differ depending on economic conditions, legislative priorities and political ideology, factors that courts have traditionally been reluctant to evaluate. Who Should Draw the Constitutional Line? The long-pending PIL ultimately raises an institutional question as much as a legal one. Should the Supreme Court define the limits of election promises? Should Parliament enact legislation regulating manifestos? Should the Election Commission receive broader statutory powers? Or should voters remain the ultimate judges of political promises through the electoral process? Each option carries constitutional consequences. Greater judicial intervention could strengthen electoral fairness but also invite criticism that courts are entering the political arena. Legislative regulation may provide democratic legitimacy but could itself become politically contentious. Expanding the Election Commission's authority would require carefully balancing regulatory independence with statutory limits. More Than a Freebies Case The Supreme Court's reluctance to rush into the matter reflects the complexity of the issue. The case is not simply about subsidies or election promises. It concerns the constitutional boundaries between the judiciary, Parliament, the Election Commission and elected governments. As political parties continue to compete through increasingly ambitious welfare commitments, the demand for legal clarity is unlikely to diminish. Whenever the Supreme Court finally hears the matter, its decision may shape not only the future of election manifestos but also the constitutional limits of judicial intervention in democratic politics. The larger question is therefore not whether freebies should be regulated. It is who, under the Constitution, has the authority to decide where legitimate welfare ends and unconstitutional electoral inducement begins.

  • Trump Claims China Rigged 2020 US Presidential Election; Beijing, US Intelligence Say No

    Dismissing the claims of interfering with 2020 US President Elections, which Joe Biden won and Trump lost, China said Washington should focus on making relations between the two nations better. By Pranjal Gupta New Delhi, July 17: China's alleged interference in the 2020 United States presidential election returned to the spotlight after President Donald J. Trump's primetime address from the White House on Thursday. The current US President alleged foreign meddling in the election, which he lost to Joe Biden. China, however, dismissed Trump's claims, saying the US should instead focus on improving relations between the two countries, as Chinese President Xi Jinping is scheduled to visit the US this September. China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said, "The relevant allegations by the US are entirely fabricated and aimed at vilifying China," adding that, "We have no interest in interfering in US elections and have never done so." Jian stressed that Washington should stop making "groundless" accusations to defame China. Asked whether this might affect the expected visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to the US in September, the spokesperson replied, "As I just said, we urge the US to stop making an issue of China in its elections and do something conducive to China-US relations." China denied Trump's 2020 election interference claims, urged improved US ties, while US intelligence also rejected allegations against Beijing. Trump visited Beijing in mid-May and met Xi, and both governments said they would adopt a new framework to manage bilateral relations. Trump invited Xi to visit the United States in September, and Beijing confirmed that Xi has accepted the invitation. What Trump Said The White House primetime address on Thursday, which mentioned alleged irregularities in the 2020 presidential election, comes as the nation is just three months away from the midterm elections. Trump claimed he had declassified multiple intelligence reports that found China's involvement in swaying the election in favour of Joe Biden. Not only China, but the US intelligence community also denied Beijing's role in the 2020 US election. "We assess that China did not deploy interference efforts and considered but did not deploy influence efforts intended to change the outcome of the US Presidential election. We have high confidence in this judgment," read a 2021 report by the National Intelligence Council, US.

  • India Joins Select Nations' Group to Have Hydrogen-Powered Train

    Jind (Haryana), Jul 17 (PTI) Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Friday flagged off India's first hydrogen-powered train connecting Jind to Sonipat in Haryana from here, calling it a successful example of the 'Make in India' campaign. With this, India has joined a select group of countries that have operational hydrogen-powered trains and marks an important step towards the adoption of clean and sustainable mobility in the railway sector. The 89-km distance between Jind and Sonipat will be covered in two hours, with the train halting at 12 intermediate stations. After flagging off the train, the prime minister also dedicated to the nation and laid foundation stone of various development projects worth Rs 14,700 crore. PM Modi flagged off India’s first indigenous hydrogen-powered train between Jind and Sonipat. Addressing a public gathering later, Modi called the hydrogen-powered train a successful example of the 'Make In India' campaign. Today, Indian Railways has taken a major step and this hydrogen train from Jind to Sonipat is the world's most powerful train, he asserted. Referring to the West Asia conflict, Modi said India receives huge quantity of petrol, diesel, LPG gas, and fertilizers through the Strait of Hormuz. However, for the last three to four months, this path has continuously become a battlefield, he said. Despite the war and oil crisis, India's railways and the country's development vehicle has not stalled, he said. "If this situation had arisen before 2014, the work of India's railways would have come to a complete standstill," he asserted. Modi also said that his visit to Jind has opened a window to old memories. "I cannot forget the love I have got," he said. Jind's 'ghee' and 'ghevar' have not changed in years but its 'tevar' (attitude) has, he said, while adding Jind is becoming a model of BJP's good governance. Names of Jind, Sonipat and Haryana will come up whenever there is mention of hydrogen train, I congratulate the entire country, he added. The train, styled in a striking sky-blue and white colour scheme, is powered by hydrogen fuel cell technology, which converts hydrogen into electricity to propel the train. The process produces only water vapour as a by-product, resulting in zero carbon emissions during operation. Compared to diesel trains, they eliminate tailpipe emissions, lower dependence on fossil fuels and fossil fuel imports, and operate with significantly less noise. Unlike conventional electric trains, they do not require continuous overhead electrification infrastructure, as electricity is generated onboard through hydrogen fuel cells, making them a clean and efficient solution. The use of green hydrogen also reduces dependence on electricity generated from fossil fuel-based thermal power plants, supporting India's transition to sustainable transport. India's hydrogen train features a 10-coach configuration, making it among the longest hydrogen-powered passenger trains developed so far. Its 3,200 HP propulsion system makes it one of the most powerful hydrogen-powered trainsets in operation A 1,200-kilowatt hydrogen-fuel-cell-propulsion system will power the 10-car trainset with a capacity of around 2,600 passengers, demonstrating the scalability of hydrogen-powered rail transport for high-capacity passenger operations. (Except headline, the content is sourced from PTI)

  • US Senate Ignores Europe's Record Gas Shopping from Russia, But Corners India

    US sanctions bill targets India over Russian oil while exempting European gas imports, uranium purchases and key US-Russia cooperation. By Pranjal Gupta New Delhi, July 17: Sixty US Senators have honoured the late Republican Senator Lindsey Graham by introducing a bill that seeks to impose 100% tariffs on countries purchasing oil from Russia, including India and China. The United States argues that trade with Moscow helps fund its war against Ukraine, which began in 2022 and continues with no clear end in sight. However, the Senators have overlooked continued European imports of Russian natural gas, as well as ongoing US-Russia cooperation in the nuclear and space sectors. A Finland-based think tank CREA has pointed out that, at times, the European Union's spending on Russian fossil fuels has exceeded the direct financial aid it has provided to Ukraine. Critics argue that this amounts to "arming the victim with one hand and paying the aggressor with the other." According to the Financial Times, Europe bought a record amount of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Russia's largest LNG project during the first half of 2026. European countries purchased almost all the gas produced by the Siberian facility, despite the European Union preparing to ban Russian gas imports in the coming months. The surge in purchases suggests that buyers are securing supplies before the restrictions take effect. The proposed US sanctions bill targets Russian oil buyers while exempting European gas imports and several American strategic interests. (AI-Generated Image) The bill exempts countries, mostly in Europe, whose imports of Russian natural gas account for less than 15 per cent of Russia's total natural gas exports, provided they are taking significant steps to reduce those imports. It also exempts US purchases of Russian uranium for nuclear reactors and the production of medical isotopes. In addition, activities carried out under US-Russia cooperation in the nuclear and space sectors are excluded from the proposed sanctions. Tariffs on 5 Countries While the United States has carved out exemptions for its own strategic interests and those of several European nations, it is proposing 100% tariffs on countries including India, China, Slovakia, Hungary and Azerbaijan. If enacted, the legislation would mark the first time the US Congress has explicitly authorised the use of tariffs as a geopolitical tool to penalise countries accused of financing another nation's war effort. "Until the very day he passed, Lindsey remained focused on passing the Russia sanctions bill. Passing this legislation would honour my brother's steadfast commitment to our national security, and it would provide President Trump with additional leverage to bring this war to an end," Senator Darline Graham said. Bill Named After Linsey O. Graham The bill was conceived by Democratic Senator Richard Blumenthal and Lindsey Graham, who died last week. In his final days, Graham visited Ukraine, where he met government officials and people affected by the four-year-long war. There have been unverified claims that Graham may have been poisoned by Russian agents, but no US official has confirmed the allegation. The proposed legislation is titled the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026.

  • Three Bills, One Pattern? Monsoon Session May Expand the Centre's Regulatory Reach

    The Centre's Monsoon Session agenda features three major Bills that, despite covering different sectors, reflect a common theme of expanding regulatory oversight. From NGOs and national symbols to higher education, the proposed laws raise important constitutional questions about executive power, institutional autonomy and fundamental freedoms. By Mahima Katal New Delhi, July 17: As Parliament prepares for the Monsoon Session beginning July 20, the Union government has placed an ambitious legislative agenda before lawmakers. At first glance, the proposed amendments to the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA), the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, and the higher education regulatory framework appear to address unrelated policy areas. One concerns foreign funding of non-governmental organisations, another national symbols, and the third the governance of universities. Taken together, however, they reveal a broader governance trend: the steady expansion of the Union government's regulatory role over civil society, public institutions and spaces traditionally governed by autonomous bodies. Whether viewed as necessary administrative reform or increasing centralisation, the proposed laws are likely to trigger important constitutional and legal debates that extend well beyond the Monsoon Session. The FCRA Amendment: From Regulating Funds to Controlling Assets Among the most significant proposals is the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026, which seeks to create a statutory mechanism for managing the assets of organisations whose FCRA registrations are cancelled, surrendered or allowed to lapse. Under the proposal, a Designated Authority would be empowered to oversee, manage and eventually dispose of foreign-funded assets. While the Bill expressly requires the religious character of places of worship to be preserved during the process, it also significantly expands the government's authority by allowing permanent acquisition of assets belonging to organisations that no longer comply with FCRA requirements. The FCRA has progressively become one of the government's principal regulatory tools for overseeing NGOs receiving foreign contributions. The 2020 amendments had already reduced the ceiling on administrative expenses from 50 per cent to 25 per cent, prohibited sub-granting of foreign funds and tightened compliance requirements. The latest amendment moves beyond regulating the use of foreign contributions. It raises a more fundamental legal question: Should the consequences of losing FCRA registration extend to state control over an organisation's assets? The proposal is likely to revive debates around proportionality, due process and the balance between regulatory oversight and the freedom of association guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. Vande Mataram: National Respect or Criminalisation? The proposed Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Bill, 2026 represents another significant shift. According to government sources, the amendment seeks to place Vande Mataram on the same statutory footing as the National Anthem by making insults to, or obstruction of, the singing of the national song a punishable offence. Unlike Jana Gana Mana, whose legal status has been considered in several judicial decisions, Vande Mataram occupies a unique constitutional and historical position. While it has immense national significance, it has never been accorded identical statutory protection. The proposal therefore raises questions that go beyond symbolism. Would criminal penalties apply only to deliberate disruption, or could they extend to refusal to participate? Could such provisions invite challenges under Article 19's guarantee of free expression or Article 25's protection of freedom of conscience and religion? The Supreme Court has consistently distinguished between respect for national symbols and compelled participation. Whether Parliament can redraw that balance through legislation may eventually become a matter for judicial scrutiny. Higher Education: One Regulator Instead of Many The government also plans to advance the Viksit Bharat Shiksha Adhishthan Bill, 2025, arguably one of the most consequential institutional reforms on the legislative agenda. The Bill proposes replacing the University Grants Commission (UGC), the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) and the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) with a unified regulatory framework for higher education. Supporters argue that multiple regulators have created duplication, conflicting standards and unnecessary compliance burdens. A unified structure, they contend, could simplify governance, improve accountability and align higher education with the objectives of the National Education Policy. Critics, however, are likely to ask whether regulatory consolidation also means greater centralisation. Universities have historically enjoyed varying degrees of academic and administrative autonomy. A single regulatory architecture inevitably raises questions about institutional independence, the distribution of powers between the Union and states, and the future of specialised regulators. A Common Governance Pattern Although each Bill addresses a different policy sector, they appear connected by a common administrative philosophy. The proposed FCRA amendment increases executive control over organisations even after their regulatory status changes. The Vande Mataram amendment seeks to expand statutory regulation into questions of national symbolism and public conduct. The higher education reform would consolidate regulatory authority under a single institutional framework. In each instance, the State's role shifts from prescribing standards to exercising broader supervisory authority. For the government, these measures may represent efforts to improve compliance, reduce institutional fragmentation and strengthen governance. For critics, they may signal an increasing concentration of regulatory power within the executive. The Constitutional Questions Ahead As these Bills move through Parliament, the principal debate is unlikely to be confined to policy objectives alone. Instead, courts, legal scholars and constitutional experts may eventually examine whether these measures maintain an appropriate balance between effective governance and constitutional freedoms. Questions concerning proportionality, institutional autonomy, freedom of association, freedom of conscience and federalism are likely to feature prominently if the legislation is enacted and challenged. The Monsoon Session may therefore be remembered not merely for the number of Bills introduced, but for what they collectively suggest about the evolving relationship between the Indian State and the institutions it seeks to regulate.

  • The Supreme Court Didn't Reject the Three-Language Policy. It Questioned Its Timing

    The Supreme Court has questioned the timing, not the validity, of introducing a third language from Class 9. This article explores what the Court said, the evolution of India's three-language policy, and why the debate extends beyond politics to pedagogy and education reform. By Mahima Katal New Delhi, July 16: The Supreme Court's recent observations on the introduction of a third language from Class 9 have reopened one of India's oldest education debates. While the Bench was not adjudicating the validity of the CBSE's language policy, its remarks have shifted attention from the politics of language to the pedagogy of learning: When is the right time for students to begin studying a third language? During the hearing of Tamil Nadu's challenge to the establishment of Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalayas (JNVs) in the state, a Bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and R. Mahadevan orally advised the Centre against introducing a third language at the Class 9 level. Justice Nagarathna observed that students already face considerable academic pressure at that stage and suggested that any additional language should ideally be introduced in Classes 5 or 6. Although the observations are not legally binding, they have injected a new dimension into the ongoing debate over India's three-language policy by questioning its implementation rather than its objective. The Court's Concern Was About Timing The case before the Supreme Court primarily concerns Tamil Nadu's opposition to establishing Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalayas, schools run by the Union government that follow the three-language formula. The state has historically resisted the schools, arguing that they are incompatible with Tamil Nadu's long-standing two-language policy. During the proceedings, the state's counsel argued that the CBSE framework requires students to begin studying a third language from Class 9. Reacting to this, Justice Nagarathna remarked that introducing a new language at such a crucial academic stage could increase stress for students. "If you want to introduce a new language, then please do it at Class 5 or Class 6 level but not at Class 9 level," she observed, adding that Class 9 marks the beginning of heightened academic pressure. The Bench also clarified that the three-language policy itself does not require Hindi to be the third language. "The State language has to be taught, English has to be taught and any third language. It doesn't say Hindi," Justice Nagarathna noted. The remarks sought to distinguish the policy's educational framework from the political controversy that often surrounds it. Why the Three-Language Policy Has Long Been Contested The three-language formula is not new. It traces its origins to the recommendations of the Kothari Commission in the 1960s and was incorporated into the National Policy on Education in 1968. The idea was to encourage multilingualism by requiring students to study their regional language, English and another Indian language. The National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 retained this principle while emphasising that no language should be imposed on any state. It also encouraged greater flexibility in implementation and promoted teaching in the mother tongue or regional language during the foundational years of schooling. Despite these assurances, the policy has remained politically contentious, particularly in Tamil Nadu, where successive governments have consistently opposed the three-language formula. The state argues that its two-language policy—Tamil and English—adequately serves students without increasing their academic burden or creating concerns about indirect Hindi promotion. The Centre, however, maintains that students are free to choose any Indian language as the third language and that the policy aims to strengthen multilingualism rather than promote a specific language. The Educational Question The Supreme Court's observations move the debate beyond politics and into the realm of educational policy. Research on language acquisition generally suggests that younger children are better equipped to learn additional languages. Early exposure allows students to develop pronunciation, comprehension and vocabulary more naturally, while language learning becomes comparatively more demanding as children grow older. By Class 9, students are preparing for board examinations and dealing with a significantly heavier academic workload. Introducing a new compulsory language at that stage, the Court suggested, may undermine rather than support educational outcomes. Although the Bench did not rely on educational research during the hearing, its remarks reflect a widely accepted pedagogical principle: language learning is often more effective when introduced during the middle or foundational years of schooling. Oral Observations Do Not Change the Law The Supreme Court's comments should not be mistaken for a judicial ruling on the validity of the language policy. The observations were made during oral arguments and do not alter the CBSE curriculum or require the Centre to modify its policy. In fact, a separate Bench of the Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice Surya Kant is already hearing challenges related to the CBSE's language policy and has declined to stay its implementation. However, oral observations often influence public discourse and may prompt policymakers to revisit aspects of implementation, particularly when they concern issues affecting school education. A Debate That Goes Beyond Language India's language policy has traditionally been viewed through the prism of identity politics and Centre-state relations. The Supreme Court's latest remarks have introduced another important consideration: the educational appropriateness of when students are expected to learn additional languages. Rather than questioning multilingual education, the Bench has asked whether the current timeline best serves students' interests. As debates over the National Education Policy continue and states negotiate its implementation, the issue may no longer be confined to which languages should be taught. It may increasingly centre on how educational policy can balance multilingual aspirations with children's cognitive development and academic well-being. The answer to that question could shape the future of India's language policy as much as the political debates that have defined it for decades.

  • Book Review l Micro Stories in 'Tales From The Heart' have words laced with emotions

    Antara B Gupta has presented words in black and white which connect readers to their own experiences in life By Sarthak Shankar Antara B Gupta’s Tales From The Heart is a collection of stories in which the author has cut down on words but not on emotions. The stories run through as slides in your mind and plays through as a silent dialogue-less film in your subconscious mind long after you have shelfed the book. Antara has attempted to tame her emotions by earmarking a maximum of 100 words for each of her 26 stories which capture varied experiences in life. The one-word titles depict either a virtue or vice each starting with a different letter arranged in an alphabetical order. The stories fueled by everyday experiences exude emotions which can connect readers to their own encounters of the past, present and even future. In short, the stories depict life with all virtues and vices. Antara B Gupta's Tales From The Heart explores life's virtues and emotions through 26 powerful stories, each told in under 100 words. (Source: The Slate) From Ambition to Courage to Pride to Sin to Jealousy to Kindness to Love to Honesty and more. The book showcases emotions for readers. From how ‘Honesty’ works in a relationship to the struggle to be ‘I’ – oneself. The author has woven words in her story ‘Honesty’ to show how divorce in an honest relationship can happen without severing ties and how life sets a battlefield for those who want to be themselves to live life on their own terms in her story titled ‘I’. The book may tempt readers to read all stories in one sitting. But every story demands time for reflection. Antara has shown that it is not necessary to write countless words when a few can spill out unfathomable emotions. (The Book has been published by Rachanakriti Publishing, Jaipur. Available on Amazon)

  • Centre Agrees to Continue Sonam Wangchuk's Medical Care; But Dialogue on Paper Leak Issue Still Pending

    When Sonam Wangchuk was urged to end his hunger strike, he instead appealed to his supporters to press the government to address the paper leak issue. By Pranjal Gupta New Delhi, July 16: A bench of the Delhi High Court on Thursday said the life of every citizen is precious and asked the central government to monitor climate activist Sonam Wangchuk's health on a daily basis. Representing the Centre and the Delhi government, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta said government doctors and experts are already monitoring Wangchuk's health, which has been deteriorating since he began an indefinite hunger strike on June 28, pressing the government to address the issue of alleged paper leak in India. The Solicitor General said, "Whenever he has permitted a government doctor to do that, I think we would be having (the reports). Sometimes a private doctor also comes to check." He added that the life of every individual was precious and that there was no objection to conducting Wangchuk's regular medical check-ups. "We appreciate the stance taken by the learned Solicitor General and accordingly direct that the medical condition of Wangchuk shall be clinically and otherwise regularly monitored on a daily basis, and depending on the opinion of the doctors, whatever medical intervention is required to check his deteriorating health condition shall also be taken," the court ordered. Centre Extends Medical Aid for Sonam Wangchuk; Dialogue on Paper Leak Issue Still Pending (AI-Generated Image) Following this, the bench of Chief Justice D K Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia disposed of the PIL. 'Force-Feed Wangchuk' The bench was hearing a plea filed by Rakesh Kumar Saini. The petitioner argued that Sonam Wangchuk's health was deteriorating as he continued his fast to press the government to address the paper leak incidents in India. Wangchuk has explicitly refused to end his protest until the government initiates a dialogue on strengthening the education system. Over the last 19 days, Wangchuk has reportedly lost 19 kilograms. His vital parameters are low, and he is struggling to even stand on his own. His condition has raised concern across the country. Several Opposition leaders, Bollywood actors, medical experts and well-wishers have urged him to end his fast, but Wangchuk remains adamant. NEET-UG 2026 The protest began after the alleged irregularities in the NEET-UG 2026 examination, which was followed by a re-test. From the initial examination to the unfolding controversy and the subsequent re-test, students came under severe pressure, while some reportedly succumbed to it and died by suicide. Wangchuk joined the ongoing protest led by the Cockroach Janata Party (CJP), which began in the first week of June. The internet-borne satire-based party has demanded the resignation of Union Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan over the alleged repeated question paper leaks that have affected the lives of thousands of students appearing for competitive examinations. No Government Representative Showed Up Yet While the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Centre, informed the bench that Wangchuk's health would be monitored daily, no government representative has yet reached out to address the concerns he has been raising.

  • Can BJP Crack Punjab Without the Akalis? Modi's Latest Visit Offers Clues

    Is the BJP trying to build its first independent electoral model in Punjab, or is this simply an attempt to improve its position in a state where it still faces significant structural challenges? By Mahima Katal New Delhi, July 16: Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Punjab on July 17 is, on paper, about infrastructure. The inauguration of the redeveloped Jalandhar Cantonment railway station, the launch of a new train named after Guru Ravidass Ji, and the unveiling of railway projects under the Amrit Bharat Station Scheme all fit neatly into the Centre's development narrative. Politically, however, the visit is about something much larger. File Image. For the first time since the Bharatiya Janata Party severed its decades-old alliance with the Shiromani Akali Dal, the Prime Minister is visiting Punjab at a moment when the party has publicly declared that it intends to contest future elections on its own. The question, therefore, is not whether the projects will benefit Punjab. It is whether the BJP is attempting to build its first independent electoral model in a state where it has historically relied on an alliance partner or whether this is simply an effort to improve its bargaining position in one of India's most politically complex states. The answer lies in how the BJP has recalibrated its strategy since 2020. For over two decades, the BJP played a complementary role in Punjab politics. While the Shiromani Akali Dal dominated rural Sikh constituencies, the BJP largely confined itself to urban, Hindu-majority seats. The arrangement allowed the party to remain electorally relevant without developing an independent statewide organisation. The farm laws changed that equation. The Akali Dal walked out of the National Democratic Alliance over the Centre's agricultural reforms, and the subsequent farmers' movement severely damaged the BJP's standing across Punjab. Overnight, the party found itself without its principal regional ally and with little organisational penetration in rural constituencies. Since then, the BJP's approach has shifted from coalition politics to organisational expansion. Instead of relying on the Akalis to mobilise Sikh voters, the party has begun investing in its own outreach. It has inducted Sikh leaders, expanded its presence across districts, increased engagement with religious institutions and attempted to project itself as a party capable of representing Punjab independently. Modi has become the face of that strategy. Over the past several years, the Prime Minister has consistently highlighted initiatives connected to Sikh heritage, from the opening of the Kartarpur Corridor and the celebration of Guru Nanak Dev's 550th Prakash Purab to the observance of Veer Bal Diwas, efforts to preserve Sikh heritage, the return of Sri Guru Granth Sahib saroops from Afghanistan and greater engagement with the global Sikh diaspora. Even during his recent visit to New Zealand, Modi devoted a significant portion of his address to Sikh history and the contribution of the Sikh community, underscoring that this outreach is no longer confined to Punjab but forms part of the BJP's broader political messaging. The July 17 visit appears to extend that strategy. The decision to flag off the Shri Guru Ravidass Ji Maharaj Express is politically significant. Guru Ravidass occupies a revered place in Punjab, particularly among Scheduled Caste communities, and his association with both Punjab and Varanasi allows the BJP to connect cultural symbolism with its development narrative. Likewise, choosing Jalandhar is unlikely to be incidental. The Doaba region has long occupied a unique place in Punjab's politics. It has one of the country's largest Scheduled Caste populations, a substantial non-resident Indian community, relatively higher urbanisation and an economy shaped by migration and remittances. Unlike parts of Malwa, where agrarian politics dominates, Doaba presents the BJP with an opportunity to expand among urban, Dalit and aspirational voters. Development projects therefore serve two purposes. Administratively, they improve infrastructure. Politically, they reinforce the BJP's attempt to reposition itself as a party of governance rather than one defined by the controversies surrounding the farm laws. This shift is particularly important because Punjab remains one of the few major states where the BJP has never emerged as the principal political force. Even at the height of its alliance with the Akali Dal, its electoral footprint remained geographically and socially limited. The party now appears to believe that sustained central investment, combined with direct engagement by the Prime Minister, can gradually substitute for the social coalition once provided by its regional ally. Whether that assumption holds remains uncertain. Punjab's politics has historically been shaped by identity, federal relations, agriculture, water-sharing disputes and regional aspirations as much as by infrastructure and welfare delivery. The memory of the farm laws continues to influence political perceptions in many parts of the state, particularly among farming communities. Moreover, the BJP faces competition on multiple fronts. The Aam Aadmi Party remains in government and continues to project itself as the primary alternative to traditional parties. Congress retains a substantial organisational presence, while the Shiromani Akali Dal, despite its recent electoral setbacks, continues to command influence in sections of the Sikh electorate. Unlike in several other states where the BJP expanded through organisational growth and charismatic leadership, Punjab presents structural constraints that cannot be addressed through development projects alone. Yet dismissing the BJP's strategy would be equally premature. The party is investing political capital in Punjab in a manner not seen before. By combining infrastructure, cultural symbolism and sustained Sikh outreach, it is attempting to create an electoral coalition that no longer depends on the Akali Dal. The significance of Modi's visit, therefore, lies less in the railway station being inaugurated than in the political message accompanying it. The BJP wants Punjab's voters to see it not merely as a national party seeking occasional electoral gains, but as an independent political contender capable of governing the state without relying on regional allies. Whether Punjab's electorate accepts that proposition will become clear only in the Assembly elections. But one conclusion is already evident: the BJP's post-Akali strategy has moved beyond experimentation. The July 17 visit is another step in what appears to be the party's most ambitious attempt yet to build an independent electoral model in Punjab. Whether that model proves viable or merely improves the BJP's position in a state where it still confronts deep structural challenges will determine whether this outreach marks a political breakthrough or simply another chapter in a long and difficult campaign.

  • Can the UN Finally Have Its First Woman Secretary-General?

    As the UN begins choosing António Guterres' successor, five women are among seven candidates. Here's how the Secretary-General is selected and why the Security Council holds the decisive power. By Mahima Katal New Delhi, July 16: For eight decades, the United Nations has been led by nine men. As the race to succeed Secretary-General António Guterres gathers momentum, the possibility of electing the organisation's first woman leader has returned to the forefront of global diplomacy. A recent statement by the United States has added fresh attention to the question, but whether the UN is ready to break its highest glass ceiling will depend on far more than public endorsements. Speaking at a press briefing in New York, US Representative to the United Nations Economic and Social Council Ambassador Dan Negrea said there was "no reason" a woman could not become the next Secretary-General. He also confirmed that the United States has been actively meeting candidates and considers the selection of the next UN chief an issue of significant importance. The comments come as the formal selection process for the UN's next Secretary-General is underway. Of the seven declared candidates so far, five are women, making this one of the strongest female fields in the history of the organisation. An Office Never Held by a Woman Since the United Nations was established in 1945, every Secretary-General has been male. From Trygve Lie of Norway to the current Secretary-General António Guterres of Portugal, the organisation has never elected a woman to its highest office despite decades of growing emphasis on gender equality within the UN system. This absence has increasingly drawn criticism, particularly as the United Nations has positioned itself as a global advocate for women's political participation and equal representation in leadership. Recognising this imbalance, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in September 2025 expressing regret that no woman has ever served as Secretary-General and encouraging member states to strongly consider nominating women for the position. While the resolution carries political significance, it does not create a legal obligation to elect or even shortlist a female candidate. What Does the UN Charter Say? Contrary to popular belief, the United Nations Charter does not prescribe any gender, nationality or regional requirement for the office of Secretary-General. Article 97 of the Charter simply states that the Secretary-General "shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." This seemingly straightforward provision conceals a highly political process. Before the General Assembly can vote, the Security Council must first agree on a single recommendation. Any of the Council's five permanent members, the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom or France, can block a candidate by exercising its veto. As a result, the Secretary-General is often described as the product of both diplomatic consensus and geopolitical compromise. The Security Council Holds the Key Although all 193 UN member states ultimately participate in the appointment through the General Assembly, the decisive stage occurs inside the Security Council. Candidates undergo a series of informal "straw polls" designed to gauge support among Council members. A candidate who attracts opposition from any permanent member rarely survives the process. This means that even a candidate enjoying overwhelming support from the wider UN membership may never reach the General Assembly if one permanent member objects. The legal framework therefore gives the Security Council, and particularly its five permanent members—a decisive influence over who leads the organisation. Why Latin America Is Being Discussed Alongside the debate over gender is another long-standing diplomatic convention: regional rotation. The UN Charter contains no requirement that the office rotate among geographic regions. Nevertheless, an informal practice has developed over the decades to ensure broad regional representation. Because previous Secretaries-General have come from Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America has never produced a Secretary-General under the modern expectations of regional balance in recent decades, many diplomats argue that the next leader should come from Latin America or the Caribbean. Several leading candidates, including former Chilean President Michelle Bachelet, UNCTAD Secretary-General Rebeca Grynspan and former President of the UN General Assembly María Fernanda Espinosa, reflect that expectation. However, like gender parity, regional rotation remains a political convention rather than a legal rule. More Than Symbolism Electing the first woman Secretary-General would undoubtedly carry historic significance. Yet the office itself is far from ceremonial. The Secretary-General serves as the UN's chief administrative officer, oversees the Secretariat, exercises diplomatic "good offices" in conflict resolution, brings threats to international peace before the Security Council under Article 99 of the Charter and acts as the public face of the United Nations during global crises. The individual selected in 2026 will inherit an institution confronting multiple challenges, from armed conflicts and humanitarian emergencies to climate change, development financing and growing divisions among major powers. For many member states, leadership qualities, diplomatic credibility and the ability to navigate an increasingly fragmented international order may ultimately outweigh symbolic considerations. A Political Choice, Not a Legal One The United States' statement signals openness to a woman leading the United Nations, but it does not determine the outcome. The Secretary-General is not elected through a popular vote or a campaign based solely on qualifications. The appointment depends on political negotiations among the Security Council's permanent members before the wider UN membership formally endorses the choice. The absence of any legal barrier means that a woman could have become Secretary-General at any point in the organisation's history. The fact that none has reflects political realities rather than constitutional limitations. With five women among the declared candidates and growing calls for gender parity, the 2026 selection process presents what many observers view as the strongest opportunity yet to make history. Whether that opportunity translates into the United Nations' first female Secretary-General will ultimately be decided not by legal rules, but by diplomacy inside the Security Council.

  • DRDO’s New Missile Goes Farther Than BrahMos. Here’s Why It Matters

    India's LRAShM promises a 1,500-km strike range, offering a cost-effective boost to maritime defence while complementing the BrahMos missile. By Ajay Haldar New Delhi: During Operation Sindoor in May 2026, India's very own BrahMos missile played a defining role against Pakistan. But there is something India has, which is said to be even deadlier: LRAShM (Long Range Anti-Ship Missile). The Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRAShM), advanced by India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). It is a next-generation weapon that is attracting growing attention from several countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Will it Replace LRAShM BrahMos? The missile, which has already undergone multiple developmental trials, is expected to complement rather than replace the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile by providing the Indian Armed Forces (IAF) with a significantly longer-range and more cost-effective anti-ship capability. DRDO's LRAShM could strengthen India's maritime defence with longer range, lower costs, and enhanced coastal strike capabilities alongside BrahMos. (Image Source: Ministry of Defense) The LRAShM is intended to reduce reliance on the more expensive BrahMos missile and extend India’s maritime strike capability much beyond the range currently being afforded by the existing anti-ship weapons. While the BrahMos has traditionally been deployed from warships, submarines, aircraft, and mobile launchers, the LRAShM is expected to become the preferred weapon for India’s future coastal defence batteries. In terms of range, the LRAShM outstrips the Brahmos with its ability to hit targets at a distance of around 1,500 kilometres, which would enable the Indian Navy to engage hostile surface combatants, amphibious task groups, and aircraft carrier strike groups well before they approach India’s coastline. The DRDO has also adopted a cost-effective design philosophy with the LRAShM program by integrating technologies and subsystems derived from several existing indigenous missile programmes rather than developing an entirely new missile architecture from scratch. This approach is expected to make the LRAShM more cost-effective than the BrahMos and reduce development costs while maintaining high operational capability.This will also allow larger inventories to be procured for coastal defence formations without imposing the same financial burden associated with high-end supersonic cruise missiles and become the Indian Navy’s primary land-based coastal defence weapon, providing persistent maritime denial across vast stretches of the Indian Ocean Region. However, the BrahMos missile will nevertheless continue to serve as the Indian Navy’s principal offensive anti-ship weapon aboard frontline warships. Its combination of supersonic speed, high terminal energy, precision strike capability, and operational maturity ensures that it will remain indispensable for naval surface combatants and multi-domain strike missions.

  • Mamata Loyalist Madan Mitra Crosses Over to Ritabrata Camp While ED Probes His Wife, Sons

    Kolkata, Jul 15 (PTI) Senior TMC MLA Madan Mitra on Wednesday crossed over to the rebel camp led by Leader of Opposition Ritabrata Banerjee, dealing another political blow to former West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee's faction, even as the legislator asserted that he had not left the party. The speculation gained additional traction after the Enforcement Directorate summoned Mitra's wife and two sons in connection with the alleged municipal recruitment scam. The veteran TMC legislator, one of Mamata Banerjee's longest-serving political associates, announced that he was resigning from all national and state organisational committees functioning under the "Kalighat TMC camp," besides stepping down as the party's chief whip in the West Bengal Assembly with immediate effect. "I have only changed my room, not my house. I am very much in the TMC," Mitra told reporters after meeting Ritabrata Banerjee in his chamber in the assembly. Dressed in a white kurta and sporting his trademark dark sunglasses, Mitra sat beside the rebel leader before declaring that he would relinquish every organisational responsibility under the Mamata Banerjee-led faction but continue as a Trinamool Congress MLA. Mamata Banerjee and Madan Mitra amid growing political tensions following the veteran TMC leader's shift to the rebel camp. "I am resigning from all national and state committees of the Kalighat TMC. I am also stepping down as chief whip. I was in the Trinamool, and I remain in the Trinamool," he said. Employing one of his trademark metaphors, Mitra added, "Perhaps that room had a comfortable bed while this one has only a cot. I have chosen the cot." The Kamarhati MLA also announced that he would participate in the July 21 Martyrs' Day programme being organised by the Ritabrata Banerjee camp, signalling his complete political alignment with the rebel faction. The development marks one of the biggest defections to the rebel camp since the TMC split erupted after the party's defeat in the 2026 assembly elections, and further weakens the Mamata Banerjee faction ahead of an increasingly bitter battle over its future. The political buzz around Mitra had gathered pace on Tuesday night after he visited the Entally residence of rebel MLA Sandipan Saha. Although Saha was away, Mitra spent considerable time with his father, former MLA Swarnakamal Saha, once regarded as a trusted Mamata Banerjee lieutenant. After returning home, Sandipan Saha spoke to Mitra over the phone, with the veteran MLA expressing his desire to meet him. Their proposed meeting on Wednesday further fuelled speculation that Mitra was preparing to switch camps. While neither Mitra nor the Ritabrata Banerjee camp linked the ED's action to Wednesday's political developments, the summons added another dimension to the intense speculation surrounding his move. For weeks, Mitra had maintained that he would not leave the party despite publicly expressing discomfort with sections of its leadership. His latest decision, however, marks a decisive break with the organisational structure headed by Mamata Banerjee. Mitra's crossover carries symbolic significance beyond legislative arithmetic. Among the earliest leaders to rally behind Mamata Banerjee after she founded the TMC in 1998, Mitra has remained one of the party's most recognisable mass faces through political highs and lows. He rose through the Congress student movement in the 1970s before becoming one of Mamata Banerjee's closest associates during the Trinamool's formative years. During the party's years in power, he served as a cabinet minister handling transport, inland water transport and sports before resigning after his arrest in the Saradha chit fund case in 2014. Even while incarcerated, he remained a popular campaigner, losing the 2016 assembly election which he contested from jail, before returning to the assembly from Kamarhati in 2021. Known as much for his trademark "Oh Lovely" refrain, impromptu songs and flamboyant public appearances as for his political survival skills, Mitra has long cultivated the image of one of Bengal's most unconventional politicians. His relationship with the party leadership had, however, shown signs of strain over the past year. In February 2025, he publicly accused election strategist I-PAC of fostering corruption within the organisation by allegedly commercialising party positions before apologising to the leadership and withdrawing his remarks. Political observers believe Wednesday's move effectively ends months of speculation over whether one of Mamata Banerjee's oldest political associates would eventually abandon her organisational camp. The rebellion itself has steadily gathered momentum around opposition to the growing influence of Abhishek Banerjee, with the dissident faction accusing the former leadership of abandoning the party's original political character. Last month, the rebels convened a special organisational session, elected senior MLA Arup Roy as the party's chairperson and unveiled a parallel organisational structure, removing Mamata Banerjee from the post. The confrontation escalated after 58 of the TMC's 80 MLAs backed Ritabrata Banerjee as Leader of the Opposition, rejecting the nominee supported by the Mamata Banerjee camp. Rebel leaders now claim the support of around 65 legislators. The party split also reached Parliament, where 20 of its 28 Lok Sabha MPs have broken away, merged with the Nationalist Citizens Party of India (NCPI) and extended support to the BJP-led NDA, while several senior state leaders have deserted the Mamata Banerjee camp. For the first time since the TMC's inception in 1998, rival factions are preparing to observe the party's politically significant July 21 Martyrs' Day separately, underscoring how the battle has moved beyond personalities to a contest over the party's organisation, political legacy and future leadership. Against that backdrop, Mitra's arrival gives the Ritabrata Banerjee camp not merely another legislator but one of the TMC's most enduring political faces - a leader whose journey has mirrored the party's own rise, turbulence and now, its deepest internal schism.

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